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Japan and Taiwan share common cultural characteristics, and their eco-
nomics have developed in similar ways too. They perform equally well on 
educational attainment, infant mortality, and unemployment meanwhile. 
Yet, Japan lags far behind Taiwan when it comes to gender equality – in-
cluding the significantly less prominent and active role of women in parlia-
ment in the former. The difference between the two countries in this regard 
can be explained by three key political factors.
 • First, women’s movements in Taiwan benefitted from the momentum created 
during the democratisation phase of the early 1990s. They have since become a 
powerful force, pushing for gender equality measures such as mandatory gen-
der quotas. In contrast, women’s movements in Japan tend to be fragmented, 
decentralised, or focussed only on specific issues. 
 • Second, the major center-right Kuomintang party in Taiwan has actively taken 
advantage of gender equality issues for electoral purposes. By contrast, in Ja-
pan the move towards greater gender equality has faced a strong backlash from 
various conservative forces ranging from the ruling center-right Liberal Demo-
cratic Party to right-leaning media, or even to conservative female academics. 
 • Third, the Japanese political system makes it harder to promote gender issues 
there compared to in the Taiwanese case. Japan’s parliamentary system mar-
ginalises the role of legislators, which in turn limits female parliamentarians’ 
efforts. Also, even if both countries have two electoral “tiers” – one to represent 
the district, and the other that of the political party – the latter one in Japan 
features a loophole, and thus has not been used to represent diverse interests 
within society.
Policy Implications
As the comparison shows, politics has played a significant role in creating a gap 
in the two countries’ gender balances. Considering that Japan has continued to 
be highly self-conscious about its international standing, there should be con-
stant external pressure for women’s political empowerment, career advance-
ment, and better work–life balance. Corrective measures could include the adop-
tion of a gender quota in politics and business, or more incentives for both men 
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Gender Gap in Politics: Women’s Presence in Parliament
Japan and Taiwan are two advanced democracies in east Asia both well known 
for their significant progress across various dimensions of human development. 
For instance, according to the united Nations Development Programme’s (uNDP) 
 Human Development Index (HDI) – which includes statistics on life expectancy, 
education, and income per capita – both Japan and Taiwan are categorised as “very 
high human development” countries. They ranked 20th and 21st worldwide in 2014, 
respectively. 
Shifting our attention to gender promotion, newspaper headlines often give an 
impression of the two countries’ similar degrees of advancement. In Japan, often 
dubbed the man behind the country’s “Womenomics” campaign, Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe has positioned himself as a passionate advocate of gender equality by 
promoting women’s participation in the workforce. moreover, in addition to be-
coming the first elected female governor of Tokyo in 2016, Yuriko Koike challenged 
Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in may 2017 by creating a new party ahead of 
the general election of that year. 
In Taiwan, meanwhile, Tsai Ing-wen became the first female president in 2016 
and was chosen by Forbes magazine as one of the world’s three most powerful fe-
male politicians alongside the German chancellor and the British prime minister in 
2017. Despite the surface-level similarities, however, the levels of gender equality 
vary dramatically between the two countries. For instance, based on sub-indexes 
such as political empowerment or economic opportunity, the Gender Inequality 
Index (GII) by the UNDP and the Gender Gap Index (GGI) by the World Econom-
ic Forum both capture a substantial difference existing in women’s status in each 
country – Japan and Taiwan were ranked 5th and 22nd worldwide in 2014 by the 
GII, and 38th and 111th in 2016 by the GGI. 
Among other things, Figures 1 and 2 below clearly show the gap in women’s pol-
itical empowerment between the two countries. As for the presence of female leg-
islators in parliament, Taiwan saw a significant increase therein between 1992 and 
2016, moving from 10 per cent to 38 per cent; the equivalent figure for the lower 
house in Japan stayed between 5 and 10 per cent, meanwhile. Further, in contrast to 
Taiwanese female candidates’ equally strong success rate in elections (calculated by 
dividing the number of elected legislators by the number of candidates) compared 
to their male counterparts, Japanese female candidates fared twice as unfavourably 
during the observed period.
Figure 1 
Proportion of Female 
Legislators in the 
Legislature
Sources: Legislative 
Yuan n.d. a; Smith and Reed 
2017. 
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This gap is problematic because empirical works drawn from various world regions 
show that when there are a higher number of female legislators, they are more 
likely to voice concerns about women’s issues and ultimately produce relevant pol-
itical results. That is, the presence of women in public office has the potential to 
transform representation by reflecting women, their lives, and their perspectives in 
the policymaking process – which in turn increases government responsiveness to 
women’s needs, interests, and views (Burrell 2006). Taiwan is no exception in this 
regard, since many female legislators have been at the centre of important legis-
lative changes there. These include measures such as financial loans to domestic 
violence victims, protecting mothers’ right to breastfeed in public areas by setting 
up relevant public facilities, or extending the number of days of paid parental leave. 
considering that these two developed east Asian democracies share several im-
portant characteristics – including roots in confucianism, similar economic and 
social developmental paths, a lack of strong trade union and leftist parties, and 
the legacies of one-party dominance until two decades ago – the apparent gender 
gap appears to be a puzzle. Although the earlier gap can be explained by Taiwan’s 
introduction of reserved seats for women (enshrined in the 1946 constitution), the 
widening differences in the past two-and-a-half decades are found to stem from 
three key political barriers that Japanese female legislators have faced. The follow-
ing sections will analyse each of these barriers, and thereafter a discussion of the 
implications for Japanese and Western policymakers will ensue.
Democratisation and Women’s Movements
A plethora of empirical works have repeatedly demonstrated that, in addition to 
committed political parties, women’s movements led by related organisations are 
crucial to advancing gender issues. In this regard, Taiwan has had in place much 
more favourable conditions since the early 1990s than Japan has. riding on the 
wave of momentum created by the democratisation trend that first started in the 
late 1980s, women’s organisations have been a powerful force behind gender polit-
ics in Taiwan (clark and Lee 2000). To begin with, the diversity and the number 
of feminist groups increased dramatically after the lifting of martial law in 1987 
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gender issues came at the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women, which was 
held in Beijing in 1995 and attended by 40,000 non-governmental organisation 
(NGo) and 181 state representatives. The conference set in place 12 action plans to 
further women’s rights, and spurred transnational information-sharing on quotas 
via academic networks and personal contacts between female bureaucrats, feminist 
politicians, and women’s movements. 
Although Taiwan was unable to participate in the 1995 Beijing conference as 
an independent country, it was still affected through various feminist channels (a 
good example is that of united States feminist Jo Freeman, who insisted on the 
importance of the number of women reaching one-quarter of total members so as 
to have a substantial impact within any organisation). As a result, feminist activists 
attempted to increase the number of reserved seats for elections at all levels and a 
strong women’s group – The Awakening Foundation – pressured the prime minis-
ter to convene the Commission for the Promotion of Women’s Rights in 1995. With 
respect to other key legislative changes, activists helped bring about ones in the late 
1990s that made divorce law and parenting law more women-friendly – and also 
helped secure the provision of parental leave and childcare facilities for employees 
in 2002 and 2007, respectively. In the second decade of this century, meanwhile, 
women’s rights advocates in Taiwan have closely monitored and reviewed laws and 
administrative measures that go against the uN convention on the elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
Despite Japan’s longer history of women’s movements, beginning with the suf-
fragettes in the 1930s, women’s organisations have played only a relatively mar-
ginal role in promoting gender equality as compared to in Taiwan. As often noted 
by students of Japanese gender politics (Gelb 2003; Gaunder 2015; Dalton 2015), 
women’s movements in Japan can be characterised as fragmented, decentralised, 
single-issue focussed, and/or short-lived. And oftentimes their primary interests – 
for example, with the Housewives Association (Shufuren) – never lay in securing 
equal rights and opportunities for working women but rather with protecting con-
sumer rights and preventing environmental pollution instead (mcKean 1993). Al-
though women’s organisations have played a crucial role in issues such as the ban-
ning of prostitution or the advancement of abortion rights, they never went as far 
as becoming a unified and consistent political force pushing for women’s political 
empowerment on the back of a mandatory gender quota. 
So, why has Japan lacked large-scale, nationwide umbrella women’s organisa-
tions or a broad coalition of groups with ambitions encompassing feminist goals? 
Despite the lack of systematic research hereon to date, two potential reasons can 
be pointed out. First, Japanese social movements in general have not had an op-
portunity to politicise issues through a democratisation movement; women’s issues 
are no exception to this. This is a huge contrast to Taiwan, where social movements 
have been politicised through various advocacy NGos since multiparty competition 
began in earnest in the early 1990s. 
Second, there is a marked difference in the intersection of gender issues with 
key political cleavages. In both countries, nationalistic issues emerged as significant 
ideological divisions between left and right during the democratic transition period. 
Taking either a diplomatic or military stance towards mainland china has been the 
core cleavage in Taiwan, while in Japan the primary political divide has been on the 
recognition of its wartime crimes and on the approval or rejection of the country’s 
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peace constitution Article 9 (which renounces Japan’s right to wage war). unlike 
Taiwan, where the core aspects of gender promotion never overlap with the coun-
try’s key political dividing line, feminist movements by their very nature in Japan 
often go against what right-wing forces stand for. A clear example can be found in 
the strong reactions to feminists trying to politicise the issue of the comfort women 
exploited and sexually abused by the Japanese occupiers during World War II. This 
is similar to women’s health concerns such as breast cancer or osteoporosis in the 
uS, which can run the risk of becoming highly contested healthcare issues – or, 
alternatively, women’s reproductive rights potentially overlapping with conflictual 
religious cleavages in Latin America. 
Partisan Bias on Gender Promotion
In light of the previous scholarship, the ideological spectrum of the incumbent gov-
ernment is often identified as a crucial factor affecting gender promotion. Several 
empirical works have pointed out the effect of partisan bias: there is a noticeable 
difference between left-wing and right-wing governments (Swers 2013). The key 
point of these works is that women’s issues tend to be better represented under left-
wing governments, who often emphasise progressive values such as inclusiveness, 
diversity, and equality. 
In this regard, there seems to be no clear partisan bias on gender issues in Tai-
wan. It was the centre-right Kuomintang (KmT) party that adopted reserved seats 
for women in the 1946 constitution. moreover, the adoption of party-level gender 
quotas at the turn of the twenty-first century is another clear example indicating 
minimal division between key Taiwanese political parties on gender issues. Initially 
adopted by the centre-left Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1996 as a 25 per 
cent quota for women candidates, the KmT followed in its footsteps in the year 
2000 – both parties eventually agreed to put in place the 50 per cent nomination 
rule (at the party level) during the 2005 constitutional reform, meanwhile. 
Beyond these quota-related developments, there are other pieces of evidence 
supporting the notion that the KmT is not an anti-gender-promotion party. For 
instance, in 2004 several legislators from the center-right Pan-Blue coalition – con-
sisting of the KmT, the People First Party, and the New Party – formed the Female 
Legislators Alliance to promote women’s welfare in the Legislative Yuan. Also, the 
KMT elected Hung Hsiu-chu as the first chairwoman of the party in 2016. More-
over, even when it comes to sponsoring important bills promoting women’s inter-
ests, the KmT did not lag behind the centre-left DPP at any point between 1992 and 
2016 (Shim 2016b). 
Unlike Taiwan, gender-promotion efforts regarding work–life balance, equal 
employment and promotion, and domestic violence have met with a marked back-
lash on various fronts in Japan. To begin with, the long-ruling LDP is known for its 
anti-women stance. Reflected in its last-place rank among major political parties in 
Japan regarding the proportion of female legislators it counts among its numbers, 
the LDP is known for opposing the introduction of any kind of gender quota on 
the grounds that it could be a form of “reverse discrimination” (Yoshida 1999: 61). 
Going further, right-wing male politicians have also been outspoken in their deni-
gration of gender issues – like, for example, masakuni murakami (a former Diet 
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member), who once equated “gender equality” with being a communist idea and 
criticised its alleged challenge to traditional family values (Gelb 2003). conserva-
tive press outlets like Yomiuri and Sankei have echoed this sentiment, and “gender 
equality issues” have often come under attack from ultra-right wing groups such as 
the Nihon Kaigi – whose credo is “going back to the pre-war structure” (Hayashi 
2000). 
Beyond the “usual suspects,” the conservative influence stemming from cer-
tain women themselves was also not negligible however. Female academics such as 
Hasegawa michiko, who advocates the traditional male-breadwinner model, have 
played a significant role in advancing the conservative agenda – particularly by at-
tacking basic gender equality law (osawa 2015). Furthermore, in the early years of 
the new century, conservative women’s groups – for example the Japanese Women’s 
Association (Nippon Josei no Kai) – actively engaged in public and political cam-
paigns to defend a woman’s role as wife and against feminist ideas (osawa 2015). 
To make matters worse, even the centre-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
did not actively push the gender issue to the forefront of politics when it was in 
government. empirical works on gender politics show that the adoption of a gender 
quota in the legislature tends to be taken up by imitation by leftist parties across 
countries, and then either becomes law or further support follows from other key 
parties (caul 2001). Japan goes against this trend, since the DPJ never adopted a 
party-level gender quota even during the period of its stable majority rule (2009–
2011). 
Constraining Political Institutions
For countries like Japan lacking both a strong social-democratic party and uni-
fied women’s interest groups, having a presidential structure could have provided a 
channel through which entrepreneur legislators actively promote women’s issues. 
Because legislators’ independence is guaranteed for a fixed term within this struc-
ture, higher levels of legislative activism by individual legislators have been report-
ed in presidential democracies than in parliamentary ones (olson and mezey 1991). 
Taiwan is not an exception to this general pattern, where each legislator perceives 
himself or herself as an independent law-making institution (Shim 2016a). Reflect-
ing this, Taiwanese legislators are much more likely to deviate from the party line, 
are better resourced with more full-time staff, and also each sponsor a substantially 
higher number of bills. 
considering that many of the articulated gender issues resonate well with the 
public (such as fixed parental leave or childcare benefits), active engagement with 
these matters can be a particularly tempting choice. This is specifically true for new-
ly elected legislators, ones without a strong political base such as organised support 
groups or local constituents, or those who have fought for equality before. Reflect-
ing this, based on my own calculations, more than 90 per cent of all bills related 
to gender promotion (concerning such issues as abortion rights, maternity leave, 
subsidies for mothers, domestic violence, workplace/employment discrimination, 
female career advancement, maternal healthcare, long-term care for the eld erly, 
and childcare) are submitted by legislators in Taiwan – particularly by newly elect-
ed ones with a civil society background – while the equivalent figure was less than 
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50 per cent thereof for Japan between 1992 and 2016. This gap appears even starker 
when comparing the average number of bills concerning women’s interests sup-
ported per legislator – more than 20 times higher in Taiwan than in Japan. 
In addition to the limited initiatives by female legislators in Japan under par-
liamentary rule, an institutional loophole in that country’s new electoral rules 
blocks another potential avenue for gender promotion. Both Japan and Taiwan 
changed to two-tiered electoral systems (where voters now cast two votes: one for a 
 district-level candidate, and one for a party-level one – but, at the same time, with-
out any linkages between the two tiers in allocating total seats) in 1994 and 2005, 
respectively. under the new system, the party tier is designed to serve nationwide 
interests. In the case of Taiwan, it has indeed fulfilled that function since the KMT 
and DPP have nominated a wide array of national-level specialists or representa-
tives – for example, child experts, nurses, doctors, the disabled, or those working 
for NGos. on the contrary, Japan allows the same candidate to be listed at both 
the district and party tiers and has used the latter to revive the “best-placed losers” 
from the district tier. In other words, even if a candidate did not win in the district 
that they ran in they can still be elected at the party tier if the vote number gap left 
them close to the winner as compared to the other candidates. 
And, in fact, roughly 60 per cent of elected Japanese candidates at the lower 
house party tier have been elected this way since the electoral reform of 1996. This 
rule has incentivised candidates to be district-oriented, and has specifically dis-
advantaged female candidates in Japan for the following reasons: Preparing to be 
a district-tier legislator is not favourable for female candidates, because it neces-
sitates a substantial amount of constituency face time through presenting oneself 
physically in person (miura, Shin, and Steele 2018). For female candidates who have 
family obligations outside of work, this poses a significant barrier. Moreover, after 
being elected, maintaining one’s district requires legislators to build local-level net-
works through sports clubs, alumni associations, or personal political apparatus, 
leaving little time to design and promote policies with nationwide implications like 
gender promotion. As presented in Figure 3 below, the evidence clearly supports 
this: when it comes to promoting gender issues through sponsoring related bills, 
party-tier legislators in Taiwan are 70–80 per cent more likely to back gender issue 
bills than their district-elected counterparts are. In contrast to this, both party- and 
district-tier legislators in the Japanese lower house almost entirely disregard gen-
der issues – and there is no tangible difference between the two on this. 
Figure 3 
Proportion of Gender 
Bills between Elected 
Tier in Japan and 
Taiwan
Sources: National Diet 
Library n.d.; Legislative 
Yuan n.d. b.
Note: Gender bill 
denotes one related to 
gender promotion, and 
the specified results are 
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How Should Europe Facilitate Gender Promotion in Japan?
Looking back, most of the drivers of gender promotion in Japan came from external 
factors and for instrumental reasons. For instance, corruption scandals such as the 
Recruit Scandal led to the “Madonna Boom” in the 1989 upper house election – large 
numbers of female candidates were thereafter fielded by the Social Democratic Par-
ty of Japan with success. Similarly, cut-throat political competition in the first dec-
ade of this century led to the nomination of several female candidates by Junichiro 
Koizumi in 2005 and Ichirō Ozawa in 2009 – often labelled as “Koizumi Children 
and Ozawa Children,” respectively. Moreover, Prime Minister Abe’s  Womenomics 
is designed to solve low fertility and ageing society problems by tapping into a 
“under utilised resource” – thus furthering economic growth.
As can be seen from its high levels of uN budget contribution (the second-high-
est of any country in the world), Japan remains acutely self-conscious about its in-
ternational standing. That is, the country’s policymakers and opinion leaders have 
long shown an active interest in maintaining its place in international society in 
addition to preoccupying themselves with whether Japan is meeting international 
standards. considering the rising number of foreigners visiting Japan – according 
to the Japan National Tourism organization, the number thereof increased from 
8.4 million in 2012 to 28.7 million in 2017 – it is high time for european policy-
makers to politicise the issue of promoting gender equality by exerting strong pres-
sure from outside. 
In this sense, events such as the fifth annual World Assembly for Women! 
(WAW!) meeting in Tokyo, scheduled to be held in March 2019, can serve as an 
invaluable opportunity – one that will bring together representatives from all over 
the world. The pressure applied should materialise beyond mere rhetoric, given the 
previous tendency of overpromising and under-delivering in Japan. During speech-
es given at the UN General Assembly in September 2013 and the World Economic 
Forum in January 2014, for instance, Prime minister Abe emphasised the need to 
incorporate women into Japan’s workforce – and started his 2014 cabinet with the 
highest-ever number of female ministers included (7 out of 18). However, today the 
number thereof has dropped to just one with his recent cabinet reshuffle; unsurpris-
ingly, so did Japan’s gender gap ranking in 2017 too (114th out of 144 countries). 
Also, we should bear in mind that most of the female politicians who entered into 
politics as a result of the external factors/instrumental reasons specified above ulti-
mately faded into the background rather quickly. 
Therefore, external pressure regarding gender promotion in Japan should go 
beyond measures for achieving only temporary window dressing; it should rather 
be about making concrete attempts to institutionalise this issue area in the long 
term. As for the political empowerment of women in Japan, there should be clear 
pressure from european policymakers for the adoption of mandatory gender quotas 
at both the local and national levels. Given the two-tiered electoral system of Ja-
pan, at least half of party-level nominations should include female candidates. This 
means closing the current electoral loophole in the lower house party tier, which 
allows the dual nomination of district-tier candidates, as well as shifting the whole 
incentive structure so as to attract female candidates who can promote nationwide 
interests – similar to in Taiwan. 
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In addition, there should be clear measures in place on women’s career ad-
vancement and work–life balance within the private sector. When Womenomics 
was at its peak in 2014, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare earmarked 
some JPY 120 million (eur 940,000) in subsidies for companies hiring women for 
managerial positions – but ended up receiving zero applications. In a similar vein, 
although a generous 12-month paternity leave period exists by law in Japan, the 
take-up rate of it is only 2–3 per cent (oecD 2016). Given Japan’s male-oriented 
work culture, mere recommendations or weak incentives are not expected to bear 
much fruit. What should be pushed by European policymakers is, rather, either 
legalising gender-promotion measures, enforcing strict penalties for not applying 
them, or creating stronger incentives – as applied in other countries. For instance, 
similar to the schemes applied in the Nordic countries, Japan could make paternity 
leave mandatory for a family to be eligible for the full amount of parental leave 
benefits available to both parents combined. Considering the potential burden this 
could cause to small enterprises, these measures might first be applied to firms with 
a large number of employees (say 300 to 500). 
Despite its slow progress in the advancement of gender equality, we should not 
forget that Japan is one of the countries that went through the fastest modernisa-
tion process of the late nineteenth century. With the right amount of nudging from 
outside, Japan hopefully will be able to internalise the significance of gender pro-
motion and spearhead the progress among other Asian countries too – just like it 
once did with its economic development. 
References
Burrell, Barbara (2006), Looking for Gender in Women’s Campaigns for National 
Office in 2004 and Beyond: In What Ways Is Gender Still a Factor?, in: Politics 
and Gender, 2, 3, 354–362.
Caul, Miki (2001), Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: 
A Cross-National Analysis, in: Journal of Politics, 63, 4, 1214–1229.
clark, cal, and Janet clark (2008), Institutions and Gender empowerment in Tai-
wan, in: Kartik Roy, Hans Blomqvist, and Cal Clark (eds), Institutions and Gen-
der Empowerment in the Global Economy, World Scientific Studies in Interna-
tional Economics, 5, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 131–150.
Clark, Cal, and Rose J. Lee (2000), Democracy and “Softening” Society, in: Rose 
J. Lee and cal clark (eds), Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 185–192.
Dalton, emma (2015), Women and Politics in Contemporary Japan, Abingdon, 
OX, New York, NY: Routledge.
Gaunder, Alisa (2015), Quota Nonadoption in Japan: The Role of the Women’s 
Movement and the Opposition, in: Politics and Gender, 11, 1, 176–186.
Gelb, Joyce (2003), Gender Policies in Japan and the United States: Comparing 
Women’s Movements, Rights and Politics, Heidelberg: Springer Nature.
Hayashi, michiyoshi (2000), Fashizumuka suru feminizumu (Fascism-Turning-
Feminism), in: Shokun, 7, 88–98.
Legislative Yuan (n.d. a), Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), www.
ly.gov.tw (11 July 2018).
   10    GIGA FocuS | ASIA | No. 5 | NovemBer 2018
Legislative Yuan (n.d. b), Legislation Search, http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw 
(11 July 2018).
McKean, Margaret (1993), Equality, in: Takeshi Ishida and Ellis Krauss, Democ-
racy in Japan, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 201–224.
miura, mari, Kiyoung Shin, and Jackie F. Steele (2018), Does “Constituency Face-
time” Reproduce Male Dominance? Insights from Japan’s Mixed-Member Ma-
joritarian Electoral System, paper presented at the 2018 International Political 
Science Association meeting, Brisbane, Australia.
National Diet Library (n.d.), Legislation Search, http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/Search-
Sys/ (19 September 2018).
oecD (2016), OECD Statistics on Employment: Length of Maternity Leave, Par-
ental Leave, and Paid Father-Specific Leave, https://stats.oecd.org/index.
aspx?queryid=54760 (19 September 2018).
olson, David m., and michael L. mezey (1991), Legislatures in the Policy Process: 
The Dilemmas of Economic Policy, 8, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Osawa, Kimiko (2015), Traditional Gender Norms and Women’s Political Participa-
tion: How Conservative Women Engage in Political Activism in Japan, in: Social 
Science Japan Journal, 18, 1, 45–61.
Shim, Jaemin (2016a), Welfare Politics in Northeast Asia: An Analysis of Welfare 
Legislation Patterns in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, PhD Dissertation, ox-
ford: University of Oxford.
Shim, Jaemin (2016b), Gender and Politics in Northeast Asia: Legislative Patterns 
and Performance of Female Legislators in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, pa-
per presented at the 6th european Political Science Association, Annual General 
conference, Brussels, Belgium (23–25 June).
Smith, Daniel m., and Steven r. reed (2017), The Reed-Smith Japanese House 
of Representatives Elections Dataset, Harvard Dataverse, https://dataverse.har-
vard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/QFEPXD (19 Septem-
ber 2018).
Swers, michele L. (2013), Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the 
Senate, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Yoshida, rie (1999), CHEER UP! – Josei to Seiji no Ii Kankei (Cheer up! Good Rela-
tions between Women and Politics), Tokyo: Kindai Bungeisha.
About the Author
Dr. Jaemin Shim is currently a Thyssen postdoctoral research fellow at the GIGA 
Institute of Asian Studies. He has received a master’s and a PhD in Politics from the 
university of oxford, and his primary research interests lie in comparative welfare 
states, gender and politics, and the representation gap. After completing his PhD in 
october 2016, he took up a postdoctoral research fellow position – funded by the 
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) – at the university of Tokyo, and 
embarked on a global project “Convergence versus Divergence of Mass-Elite Politi-
cal Cleavages: Conceptual, Methodological, and Theoretical Innovations.”
jaemin.shim@giga-hamburg.de, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/team/shim-jaemin
   11    GIGA FocuS | ASIA | No. 5 | NovemBer 2018 
Related GIGA Research
The GIGA’s Accountability and Participation research Programme investigates 
various socio-political dynamics in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the middle 
east. Its members study institutional change, political processes, and social devel-
opments in inclusive and restrictive political contexts. The main focus of research 
lies on issues of accountability and political participation in different regimes, at 
both the local and national levels. These scholars seek to understand how the de-
mand for accountability or responsiveness produces expectations and norms for 
political participation, and what the effects of different forms of participation and 
mobilisation are on accountability and regime legitimacy.
Related GIGA Publications
Koos, carlo (2015), What Do We Know About Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts? 
Recent Empirical Progress and Remaining Gaps in Peace and Conflict Research, 
GIGA Working Paper, 275, June, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/what-
do-we-know-about-sexual-violence-in-armed-conflicts. 
Lorch, Jasmin, and Bettina Bunk (2016), Gender Politics, Authoritarian Regime 
Resilience, and the Role of Civil Society in Algeria and Mozambique, GIGA 
Working Paper, 292, October, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/gender-
politics-authoritarian-regime-resilience-and-the-role-of-civil-society-in-algeria-
and-mozambique. 
Neff, Daniel, and Joachim Betz (2017), Gender Justice as an International Objec-
tive: India in the G20, GIGA Focus Asia, 3, June, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/pub 
lication/gender-justice-as-an-international-objective-india-in-the-g20.
ostermeier, martin, Sarah Linde, Jann Lay, and Sebastian Prediger (2015), SMART-
er Indicators for Decent Work in a Post-2015 Development Agenda: A Discus-
sion and a Proposal, GIGA Working Paper, 266, February, www.giga-hamburg.
de/en/publication/smarter-indicators-for-decent-work-in-a-post-2015-develop 
ment-agenda.
Schucher, Günter, and Julian rothkopf (2014), Zufriedenheit mit Taiwans Präsi-
dent Ma auf dem Tiefpunkt, GIGA Focus Asia, 2, February, www.giga-hamburg.
de/en/publication/zufriedenheit-mit-taiwans-präsident-ma-auf-dem-tiefpunkt.
Wieczorek, Iris (2016), Japan’s Alternatives to Silicon Valley, GIGA Focus Asia, 
3, July, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/japan’s-alternatives-to-silicon-
valley.
   12    GIGA FocuS | ASIA | No. 5 | NovemBer 2018
Imprint
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the 
Internet and downloaded free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-
focus. According to the conditions of the Creative Commons licence Attri-
bution-No Derivative Works 3.0 this publication may be freely duplicated, 
circulated and made accessible to the public. The particular conditions 
include the correct indication of the initial publication as GIGA Focus and 
no changes in or abbreviation of texts.
The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies – Leibniz-Institut für Globale und 
Regionale Studien in Hamburg publishes the Focus series on Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East and global issues. The GIGA Focus is edited and published by the GIGA. 
The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are responsible for the content of their articles. 
GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors and omissions, or for any con-
sequences arising from the use of the information provided.
General Editor GIGA Focus Series: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach 
Editor GIGA Focus Asia: Prof. Dr. Heike Holbig
Editorial Department: James Powell, Petra Brandt 
 
GIGA | Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 
20354 Hamburg 
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus  
giga-focus@giga-hamburg.de
